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Turned On Its Head?: 
Norms, Freedom, and Acceptable Terms in Internet Contracting 
 
Richard Warner 
 
Abstract 
 
Is the Internet turning contract law on its head?  Many commentators contend it 
is.  Precisely this issue arises in current controversies over end user license agreements 
(EULAs) and Terms of Use agreements (TOUs, the agreements governing our use of web 
sites).  Commentators complain that, in both cases, the formation process unduly restricts 
buyers’ freedom; and, that sellers and web site owners exploit the process to impose 
terms that deprive consumers of important intellectual property and privacy rights.  The 
courts ignore the criticisms and routinely enforce EULAs and TOUs.  There is truth on 
both sides of this court/commentator divide.  EULAs and TOUs are standard form 
contracts, and a standard contract formation process can guarantee acceptable terms and 
enhance freedom; however, in the case of EULAs and TOUs, the process is currently 
defective in ways that result in unfair terms that reduce freedom.  The cornerstone of the 
analysis is the claim that, when certain ideal conditions are fulfilled, standard form 
contracting is a freedom-enhancing process yielding acceptable terms.  To characterize 
the ideal formation process, the analysis combines ideas from both the relational theory 
of contracts and law and economics.  Relational theory provides the picture of contracting 
as a norm-governed activity while an adaptation of a well-known law and economics 
argument to argue yields the conclusion that, in an ideal formation process, the profit-
maximizing strategy for sellers and web site owners is to offer consumers norm-
consistent contractual terms.  I contend that norm-consistent terms are acceptable and 
freedom-enhancing.  The theory applies equally to Internet and non-Internet contracting, 
and this shows that the Internet is not turning contract law on its head; however, the 
theory also reveals that Internet contracting poses serious, unmet challenges to contract 
law.  The problem is that EULAs and TOUs contain terms not currently governed by 
appropriate norms.  As a result, the EULA/TOU formation process departs from the ideal 
formation process in ways that result in unacceptable, freedom-reducing terms.  In the 
case of EULAs, the offending terms involve prohibitions on reverse engineering and 
transfers of software to third parties.  It is likely that relevant norms will evolve relatively 
soon to govern such terms.  In the case of TOUs, the offending terms concern the 
collection of information by businesses and web sites and implicate privacy concerns.  It 
is unlikely that relevant norms will evolve in relatively soon in this case.  How are 
appropriate norms to be identified or, where necessary, created?  The analysis raises but 
does not answer this question.    
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Turned On Its Head?: 
Norms, Freedom, and Acceptable Terms in Internet Contracting 
 
Richard Warner∗ 
 
It is commonplace to contend, as Robert Hillman and Jeffrey Rachlinski do, that 
“[t]he Internet is turning the process of contracting on its head.”1  Hillman and 
Rachlinski, suggest that “[c]ontract law, with its quaint origins in cases involving the 
delivery of cotton by clipper ship or mill shafts by horse-drawn carriage, seems ill-
equipped to respond to contracts made at the speed of light,”2 and they ask, “Can contract 
law adapt to this fundamental change in the way people make contracts, or is a new legal 
order required?”3  They conclude that “existing contract law is up to the challenge.”4   
My conclusion is more cautious:  contract law is mostly—but not entirely—up to the task; 
critical challenges remain unresolved.  I will argue for this claim by considering the 
current controversy over end user license agreements (EULAs) and Terms of Use 
agreements (TOUs, the agreements governing our use of web sites).  EULAs raise 
concerns about the interaction between contracts and intellectual property; TOUS, about 
the interaction between contracts and privacy.  I focus first on EULAs.   
 
∗
 Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Visiting Foreign Professor, Law Faculty, 
University of Gdańsk, Poland.  I owe thanks for helpful comments and criticism to Graeme 
Dinwoodie, Steven Harris, and Christopher Leslie.  I owe special thanks to Harold Krent and 
Richard Wright—to the former for typically insightful guidance as to what I am actually trying to 
say, and to the latter for typically incisive and comments that corrected many false steps.   
 
1 Robert A. Hillman & Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 429 (2002) [hereinafter, Hillman & Rachlinski].  See also, Mark Lemley, 
Terms of Use 91 MINN.. L. REV. 459, 459 (2006) [hereinafter, Lemley, Terms of Use] 
(“Electronic contracting has experienced a sea change in the last decade”). 
 
2 Id. at 430. 
 
3 Id.   
 
4 Id. at 495. 
 
Courts and commentators are at odds about EULAs.   The commentators decry a 
contract formation process that the courts take in stride.5  The process:  a buyer purchases 
software in a shrinkwrapped box or—as is now more common—by downloading it 
online; a standard form contract is inside the box (a “shrinkwrap” EULA), or displayed 
on a splash screen during installation (a “clickwrap” EULA).  No negotiation is allowed; 
by the time the buyer can read the agreement the only options are to return the software, 
or accept the terms.  Where return is not a meaningful option, acquiescence is the only 
alternative.  Mark Lemley has emphasized, the tendency of EULAs to lead to 
acquiescence.  He notes that the return of the software turns out to be  
sufficiently inconvenient as to be impractical and in any event turns out in 
practice to be illusory: software vendors and retail stores generally refuse to 
accept software returned under those conditions. [In addition], the specified 
conduct that indicates acceptance is the opening of a package and the loading of 
software the consumer has already paid for--precisely the conduct one would 
expect the user to engage in if she had been unaware of the shrinkwrap license.6   
 
Lemley’s points are even more compelling when the software is downloaded online that 
there is no physical retailer to approach and no physical installation CD to return.  In a 
barrage of criticism that supports the perception that the Internet is “turning contracting 
on its head,” the commentators complain that the formation process unduly restricts 
buyers’ freedom; and, that sellers exploit the formation process to impose excessively 
seller-favorable terms that deprive buyers of important intellectual property rights.7  The 
 
5
 See infra n. 6 (academic criticisms) and n. 7 (attitude of the courts).   
 
6 See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra n. 1 at .467 – 68.   
 
7
 See Robert W. Gromulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass Market Licensing for 
Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687, 687 (2004) (“[O]ver a hundred scholarly articles have 
been written on the subject . . . [most of which] criticize EULAs, and argue that courts should not 
enforce them”).  See also Lemley, Terms of Use, supra n. 1 (arguing that free consent is lacking 
in the case of EULAs and that sellers impose unacceptable terms);  Margaret Jane Radin, 
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courts ignore the criticisms and routinely enforce EULAs (unless they find them 
objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts generally);8 indeed, the leading case, 
ProCD v. Zeidenberg,9 extols the formation process as a cost-effective practice which 
buyers readily embrace.10   
There is truth on both sides of this divide.  A standard contract formation process 
can guarantee acceptable terms and enhance freedom;11 however, when EULAs are used 
to sell software, the process is currently defective in ways that result in excessively seller-
favorable terms that reduce freedom.  Current contract law has not yet risen to this 
                                                                                                                 
Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125 (1999) (arguing that free 
consent is lacking in the case of EULAs); Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting:  
Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUSTON L. REV. 1041, 1065, 1078 
(2005) (claiming that “[p]resentation of terms and manifestation of assent are the essence of 
contract formation,” and that “[T]here is no good mechanism for protecting consumers against 
unfair or oppressive terms in end user license agreements”); compare Hillman & Rachlinski, 
supra n. 1 (arguing that traditional contract law is largely adequate to address issues arising with 
EULAs).   
 
8
 See Kevin W. Grierson, Enforceability of "Clickwrap" or "Shrinkwrap" Agreements Common in 
Computer Software, Hardware, and Internet Transactions, 106 A.L.R.5TH 309 (2003); and 
Lemley, Terms of Use, supra n. 1 at 460 - 63.  The leading case is ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 
1447 (7th Cir.1996), which has been extensively followed.  See, e. g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 
105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.1997); Mudd-Lyman Sales & Serv. Corp. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 
236 F.Supp.2d 907, 911-12 (N.D.Ill.2002); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 
F.Supp.2d 328 (D.Mass.2002); Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 
522, 563 n. 10 (6th Cir.2004).  SoftMan Products, 171 F.Supp.2d at 1088, cites Step-Saver v. 
Wyse Techn., 939 F.2d 91 (2003), and Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th 
Cir.1988) as holding that shrinkwrap licenses are unenforceable. This is a mistake.  In Step-Saver, 
both parties sent each other forms with different conditions and obligations; the EULA involved 
was one of the forms exchanged, and the question of its enforceability was a routine battle-of-the-
forms issue.  In Vault, the court did not reach the issue of the validity of EULAs generally 
because the court found that the buyer knew the terms of the license before purchasing the 
software.  Vault, at 268-70.  A case clearly rejecting ProCd is Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 
F.Supp.2d 1332 (D.Kan.2000), discussed infra, n.17.  
 
9
 Supra n. 8.   
 
10
 Id. at 1451 - 52.   
11
 See infra Section III.   
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challenge as it routinely enforces the offending terms.  There is, however, reason to think 
contract will meet the challenge, and indeed that it will do so relatively soon.   
I do not take the same, ultimately sanguine view of a second type of “digital age” 
contract—Terms of Use Agreements, often referred to as “browsewrap” agreements.  
Terms of Use Agreements (TOUs) govern the rapidly increasing variety of social, 
political, and commercial purposes for which we use web sites.  Like EULAs, TOUs are 
no-negotiation, standard form agreements; unlike EULAs, one may read them at any time 
since they are routinely accessible via hyperlinks at the bottom of home pages.  Web site 
visitors are, however, neither asked nor required to assent to the terms by clicking on an 
“I agree” button or by performing any other similar affirmative act of assent;12 thus, 
visitors may, and typically do, just “browse” on by without reading, or even opening, the 
agreement.13  The result is that, as with EULAs, passive acquiescence is the rule.  Web 
site owners may—and do—exploit this fact to impose terms which unacceptably 
compromise web site visitor’s privacy.14  Unfortunately, the prospects for rectifying this 
situation appear considerably dimmer than they do in the case of EULAs.  TOUs pose the 
most significant challenge to current contract law.  
 The cornerstone of my analysis is the claim that when certain ideal conditions are 
fulfilled, standard form contracting is a freedom-enhancing process yielding acceptable 
terms.  To characterize the ideal formation process, I combine themes and ideas from 
both the relational theory of contracts and law and economics.  Relational theory provides 
 
12
 See, e. g. Specht v. Netscape, 306 F.3d 17 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (describing the TOU formation 
process).   
 
13
 See infra n. 16..   
 
14
 See infra Section IV. 
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the picture of contracting as a norm-governed activity.  Section I defines the relevant 
concept of a norm and also defines the key notion of a value-justified norm.  Section I 
also introduces the first assumption characterizing the ideal formation process—the 
assumption (roughly) that contractual terms are consistent with relevant, value-justified 
norms.  Section II adapts a well-known law and economics argument to complete the 
characterization of the ideal formation process and argue that, in such a process, the 
profit-maximizing strategy for sellers is to offer buyers norm-consistent contractual 
terms.   
 Sections I and II comprise my main theoretical contribution:  a novel, norm-based 
theory of standard form contracting.  The theory applies equally to Internet and non-
Internet contracting, and this shows that the Internet is not turning contract law on its 
head; however, the theory also reveals that Internet contracting poses serious, unmet 
challenges to contract law.  The consideration of EULAs and TOUs in Sections III and 
IV analyze these challenges.  Section III argues that the criticisms of the commentators 
show that the use of EULAs fails to approximate the ideal formation process.  The 
problem is that they contain certain key terms concerning intellectual property rights 
where those terms are not governed by value-justified norms.  It follows that the terms 
are unacceptable and reduce freedom; consequently, legal intervention is (most likely) 
required.  However, once the lack of value-justified norms is remedied, the use of EULAs 
will yield acceptable terms and enhance freedom (assuming that there are no other 
reasons their use fails to sufficiently closely approximate the ideal formation process). 
Section IV argues for an essentially similar result in the case of TOUs:  they contain 
terms allowing the site to collect information about visitors, where those terms are not 
  8 
governed by value-justified norms.  There is one critical difference.  While there is reason 
to think that the defects in EULAs can be relatively easily remedied, there is less reason 
to be optimistic about remedying similar defects in TOUs.   TOUs pose the most difficult 
challenge to current contract law.   
 
 
I.  Norms and the Assumption of Norm Completeness 
 
When the contract formation process meets certain ideal conditions, standard 
form contracting is a freedom-enhancing process yielding acceptable terms.  The same 
point holds in actual practice to the extent that practice approximates the ideal.  I will not, 
however, make any claim about the extent to which practice approximates the ideal.  My 
claim is normative:  we should try to ensure that practice approximates the ideal.  We 
should promote freedom because free self-direction is the hallmark of the thoughtful, 
democratic citizen who guides his or her actions by principles freely adopted as the result 
of critical reflection.  We value such self-direction for its own sake.15  Failures to realize 
the ideal formation process can provide grounds for legal invention designed to bring 
practice closer to the ideal; in the case of EULAs and TOUs, there are failures justifying 
such intervention.  There are three conditions which characterize the ideal formation 
process.  This section characterizes the first; the next section, the remaining two.   
I begin by describing the purchase of a typical consumer good.  The contract is 
presented after payment and delivery, and the transaction concludes—as is typical—with 
 
15
 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); see also GERALD DWORKIN, THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988).    
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the buyer not reading the contract.16  The example:  when typical-buyer Carol discovers 
that her water heater no longer works, she phones Sears, orders a new one, and pays with 
a credit card.  After the workers finish the installation, they hand her an envelope as they 
leave.  The contract from the manufacturer of the water heater is inside.17  Carol 
understands that the contract imposes legally binding obligations, and it is important to 
her that those obligations should be acceptable (she cares about the warranties, for 
example18); however, like most consumers, she does not read the contract; she just files it 
 
16
 Many have observed that buyers do not as a rule read standard form contracts.  See Robert A. 
Hillman, On-line Consumer Standard-Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of 
Legal Implications, in JANE WINN (ED.) CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 
‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ (2006) [hereinafter, Hillman, Survey](reporting survey results 
supporting the claim that online buyers do not read contracts); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The 
Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 240-41 (1995) 
("[C]onsumers who are faced with the dense text of form contracts characteristically respond by 
refusing to read"); Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective 
Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1269-70, 1275 (1993) ("It is no 
secret that consumers neither read nor understand standard form contracts"); Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 309 (1986) (dense form contract language 
discourages consumers from reading terms). 
 
17
 In a retail transaction, the buyer typically enters two contracts—one with the manufacturer 
(containing warranties among other terms), and one with the retailer (end-seller).  In the latter 
case, the retailer is the offeree.  See Klocek, supra n. 8, at 1341.  In the former, the manufacturer 
is the offeror. See ProCD, supra n. 8, at 1452.  The Klocek court overlooks this distinction when 
it objects to the ProCD decision on the ground that the software manufacturer, ProCD, is the 
offeree, not the offeror.  Klocek, supra n. 8, at 1341.   
 
18
 William R. Darden & C. P. Rao, A Linear Covariate Model of Warranty Attitudes and 
Behaviors, 16 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH 466, 475 (1979) [hereinafter, Darden & Rao] 
concludes that “most consumers are indifferent or they are supporters of warranties in their 
present form.”  A “supporter” finds the warranty a factor in the purchase decision; an 
“indifferent” consumer does not.  Darden and Rao do not, however, distinguish between, whether 
a consumer cares that the terms be acceptable, and whether the consumer expects the 
manufacturer to comply in a meaningful fashion with those terms.  Darden and Rao emphasize 
consumer dissatisfaction with manufacturers’ responses to warranty claims; however, more recent 
studies find less dissatisfaction.  See Jean Braucher, An Informal Resolution Model of Consumer 
Product Warranty Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1405, 1447 – 57 (presenting evidence that businesses 
generally respond to product complaints in ways consumers find satisfactory).  See also Yeon-
Koo Che, Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 17 (1996); and, 
Claes Fornell & Biger Wernefelt, A Model for Consumer Complaint Management, 7 MARKET 
SCI. 287 (1998) 
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with the other unread contracts for other appliances she has purchased.19  She does not 
read the contract because she thinks she does not need to.  What she cares about is that 
the terms should be acceptable, and she assumes they are.  She assumes this because she 
assumes that they are consistent with relevant norms.  This raises three questions.  What 
are the relevant norms?  Why are provisions consistent with those norms acceptable?  
Why is it true that the provisions in the contract are consistent with the relevant norms?  
Answering these questions is the first step toward characterization of the ideal formation 
process. 
 
A.  What Are The Relevant Norms? 
I answer the question by offering examples.  Two preliminaries are necessary:  a 
definition of norms, and the observation that contracting is, in the sense defined, a norm-
governed activity.   
 
 1.  Norms defined 
A norm is a sanction-supported behavioral regularity in a group of people, where 
the regularity exists in part because each group member thinks that, other things being 
equal, each group member ought to act in accord with that regularity.20  The “ought” may 
be purely prudential, justified by a fear of legal and non-legal sanctions; or, it may be 
                                                                                                                 
 
19
 See supra n. 16.   
 
20
 See Michael Hector and Karl-Dieter Opp, What Have We Learned About the Emergence of 
Social Norms?, in MICHAEL HECTOR & KARL-DIETER OPP (EDS.), SOCIAL NORMS 394, 403 
(2001).  There are various definitions of norms, and it would be a mistake to wonder which one is 
the “correct” definition.  There are just different concepts serving different theoretical purposes.  
The text defines the concept of a norm that serves my purposes here.   
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justified in light of the values the person accepts.  As an example of a norm, imagine you 
are about to enter an elevator in which several others are already present.  Where do you 
stand?  The norm is (roughly) that you should, other things being equal, maximize the 
distance between you and the person nearest you.     
My critique of EULAs and TOUs rests on a distinction between two types of 
norms:  those that are, and those that are not, value-justified.  I contend that certain 
significant terms in EULAs and TOUs are not governed by value-justified norms and 
hence that legal intervention is required.  What, then, is a value-justified norm?  To 
answer, consider first that we typically conform to norms without much thought; when 
you step into an elevator, for example, you just unreflectively stand in the appropriate 
spot.  You think you ought to stand there, but you do not worry or wonder about the 
justification for that “ought.”  The crucial point to emphasize is that you could justify it; 
you could, that is, if you reflected on the norm under appropriate ideal conditions 
(including having sufficient time, information, lack of bias, and so on).  You could justify 
the balance the norm strikes between the value you place on not feeling crowded, and the 
value you place on being able to use the elevator when it arrives.21  In general, with 
regard to many (but, importantly, not all) norms, we would, given ideal conditions for 
reflection, regard conformity to the norm as justified in light of our values.22  Call such 
norms value-justified.  Not all norms are value-justified.  As an example of the latter sort 
of norm, imagine a norm which requires selecting men instead of women for police 
 
21
 Justification comes in degrees, of course:  our values may more or less justify a norm.  I 
suppress this complication for the sake of simplicity.   
 
22
 The appeal to reasoning under ideal conditions to justify normative conclusions begins (at 
least) with Aristotle.  See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.  For a modern exposition and 
defense of this approach, see STEPHEN DARWALL, IMPARTIAL REASON (1983). 
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officers.  Assume that, even though most unreflectively abide by the norm, they would 
not regard the norm as justified if they were to reflect on it adequately in an unbiased 
way.   
 
 2.  Contracting a norm-governed activity 
Contracting occurs against a background of norms, where the norms are value-
justified.23  Two distinct theoretical approaches to contract law--relational theory, and 
behavioral law and economics—have converged on this conclusion (albeit without the 
emphasis on value-justified norms), and I rely on their arguments.24  I do, however, need 
to be explicit about what I assume in regard to contract norms.   
I assume that for any possible contractual provision, there is at least one relevant, 
value-justified norm with which the provision is consistent or inconsistent (where a 
“relevant” norm is one the parties regard as relevant to deciding whether they should 
 
23
 The norms vary from group to group.  For example, Darden and Rao suggest that, in the case of 
warranties, higher income consumers may prefer higher prices and longer warranties while lower 
income consumers may prefer lower prices and shorter warranties.  Darden & Rao, supra n. 18, at 
475.  For simplicity I take the relevant group to be all United States consumers.   
  
24
 Relational contract theory began with an empirical study by Stewart Macaulay.  Stewart 
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business:  A Preliminary Study, 28 AMERICAN 
SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 55 (1963).  Ian McNeil developed the idea of a relational contract in 
Contracts:  Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and 
Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. L. REV. 854 (1978).  For more recent work emphasizing the 
role of norms, see, e. g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:  
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); 
Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom?  Thoughts About the Ideas 
of Ian MacNeil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775 (2000); Patrick J. Kaufmann & Louis 
W. Stern, Relational Exchange Norms, Perceptions of Unfairness, and Retained Hostility in 
Commercial Litigation, 32 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 534, 535 (1988) (noting that 
norms “exist in all exchange behavior, from very discrete transactions to highly relational 
exchange”). For the law and economics perspective on norms, see e. g. ERIC POSNER, LAW AND 
SOCIAL NORMS (2000), and James S. Coleman, Norms As Social Capital, in G. Radnitsky & P. 
Bernholz (eds.) ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM:  THE ECONOMIC APPROACH APPLIED OUTSIDE THE 
FIELD OF ECONOMICS (1987).  
  13 
agree to and be bound by a term).  Call this the norm completeness assumption.  Norm 
completeness is the first of the three assumptions which characterize the ideal formation 
process.  Norm completeness is an ideal that actual practice only approximates.  In 
practice, it may be unclear exactly what the relevant norms are (especially in the case of 
norms which resist complete articulation), or relevant norms may not even exist.  In 
addition, for simplicity, I assume that consistency with norms is an all-or-nothing matter:  
a provision is either entirely consistent or entirely inconsistent.  In practice, consistency is 
often a matter of degree.  Finally, I assume, in regard to value-justification, that our 
values show either that we ought to act in accord with a given norm, or that we ought not.  
In practice, there may be open questions where our values do not show that we ought to 
act in accord with the norm but also do not show that we ought not.   
The idealizations built into the norm completeness assumption are justified 
because the role of the assumption is to characterize the ideal formation process.  It is, 
however, worth noting that it is plausible that norm completeness is approximately true in 
actual practice.  The point is to forestall the objection that the ideal formation process is 
so unattainable in reality as to be irrelevant as a normative guide to action.  It is plausible 
that practice more or less approximates norm completeness because manufacturers have 
used standard form contracts for over a century, and it would be quite implausible to 
suggest that, over the years, relevant contractual norms have failed to evolve for at least 
some types of products and services.25   
 
25
 Standard form contracting began with the development of mass production in the late 
nineteenth century.  See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About 
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943).  Standardized warranties appeared 
around the same time.  See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 
YALE L.J. 1297, 1299 (1981).  The article presents empirical results in support of the claim that 
the warranty terms in standard form contracts are best explained as an optimal allocation of the 
  14 
 
 3. Examples 
I conclude with three examples of value-justified norms relevant to contracts.  
The first is, “Do not deceive another about a material element of a contract.”   
Contracting parties (some at least) conform to this regularity in part because they think 
they ought to.  Parties may conform to the non-deceitfulness norm unreflectively (in the 
way we unreflectively enter elevators and assume our proper place), but it is certainly 
plausible that the norm is value-justified.  That is, it is plausible that everyone would, 
after sufficient, adequately informed, and unbiased reflection, regard conformity to the 
norm as justified.  The “do not deceive” norm is one of many norms governing the 
behavior of contracting parties.  Such norms answer the question, “What should so-and-
so type of contracting party do in such-and-such type of situation?”  It is helpful to 
distinguish such norms from those which answer the question, “Should so-and-so type of 
contract contain such-and-such type of term?”26  The next example illustrates such a 
norm.   
Consider the provision, typically found in contracts for the sale of refrigerators, 
which makes the manufacturer liable for defects in the motor, shelves, and doors and the 
buyer liable for damage to the same.  This allocation of risk implements this norm:  other 
things being equal, the party who can most cost-effectively prevent a loss—the best loss-
                                                                                                                 
risk of product malfunctions between the manufacturer and the buyer.  To the extent such a risk 
allocation has become a sanction-supported regularity to which buyers and sellers think they 
ought to conform, the risk allocation is a norm.   
 
26
 For a study of norms governing contractual terms, see PRANAB BARDHAN, LAND, LABOR, AND 
RURAL POVERTY:  ESSAYS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (1984) (invoking norms to explain the 
very high degree of uniformity in terms in land contracts).   
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avoider--should bear that loss.27  This is the manufacturer in regard to defects because it 
has more expertise and benefits from economies of scale; the buyer, on the other hand, is 
the best loss-avoider in regard to damage to the motor, doors, and shelves since the buyer 
may avoid damage simply by using those items in a reasonable way.28  Like the non-
deceitfulness norm, it is plausible that this norm is value-justified.   
 It is instructive to compare the “best loss-avoider” norm to the third, and final, 
example: namely, a seller (within broad limits) may disclaim consequential damages.  It 
may seem at first sight that this cannot be a norm.  A norm is a sanction-supported 
regularity where the regularity exists in part because people think they ought to conform 
to it.  “Sellers may disclaim consequential damages” does express a sanction-supported 
regularity; sellers regularly disclaim consequential damages, and courts regularly enforce 
the disclaimers.  But how can it be true that buyers think they ought to conform to the 
regularity?  The vast majority of buyers do not even know what consequential damages 
are, let alone realize that sellers are allowed to disclaim them; so, how can it be true that 
buyers think they ought to accept and abide by the disclaimers?  The answer is that, as 
empirical studies confirm, people think that they ought to abide by the law (other things 
being equal).29  Hence, since the disclaimer of consequential damages is a legally 
 
27
 In this case, the “other things being equal” rider is particularly important.  Best loss-avoider 
concerns are just one of the many considerations that guide our judgment about who should bear 
a loss.  We may, for example, think that someone who commits an intentional tort should bear the 
losses he or she causes even if the victim is the best loss-avoider.  See generally Richard Wright, 
The Principles of Product Liability, in Symposium, Products Liability Litigation Trends on the 
10th Anniversary of the Third Restatement, 26 REVIEW OF LITIGATION 1067 (2007) 
 
28
 Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms:  The 
Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1398 (1983) [hereinafter, 
Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information]. 
 
29
 TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 64 (1990) (arguing, based on empirical studies, that 
people think they ought to obey the law).  See also MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL 
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enforceable provision, it follows that buyers think that they ought to abide by it.  In such 
cases, legal enforceability results in a sanction-supported regularity to which people think 
they ought to conform.  Call such norms, legally-generated norms.   
In the case of such norms, it is particularly important to invoke the distinction 
between norms that are value-justified and those that are not.  Grant, for the sake of 
argument, that allowing sellers to disclaim consequential damages is value-justified; 
grant, that is, that after sufficient, adequately informed, and unbiased reflection, we 
would regard the norm as justified.  Then, the legally implemented norm reflects our 
implicit evaluative judgment; on the other hand, where courts or legislatures ignore or 
misinterpret the relevant community values, they may very well create a legally-
implemented norm which is not value-justified.  Such a norm would not reflect our 
implicit evaluative judgment.  This is what has happened in the case of EULAs and 
TOUs.   
 
B.  Why Does Consistency with Relevant Norms Make Terms Acceptable?   
 
Why does Carol find terms consistent with relevant, value-justified norms 
acceptable?  In the refrigerator example, for instance, the relevant norm dictates that the 
manufacturer should be liable for defects and the buyer for damage.  Wouldn’t Carol 
prefer that the manufacturer bear liability for damage?  To answer, consider first that 
Carol herself adheres to the relevant norms.  If she were to insist on terms more favorable 
to her than the norms allow, she would be violating her own standards, demanding what 
she thinks she ought not to demand.  Some may object that we can still nonetheless 
imagine Carol insisting on more favorable terms.  This does not, however, show that 
                                                                                                                 
LEGAL STUDIES 263 - 68 (1987), and David Kairys, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF LAW 7 
(David Kairys, ed., 1990).   
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Carol does not find acceptable terms consistent with value-justified norms; it merely 
shows that Carol, like all of us, can be tempted by what she nonetheless thinks she should 
not have.  I conclude that terms consistent with value-justified norms are acceptable in 
the sense that in agreeing to such terms we agree to act in ways we think we ought to act.   
It bears emphasis that the conclusion would not follow without the assumption 
that the norms are value-justified.  If a norm fails to be value-justified, then our values 
lead to the conclusion that we ought not to act in accord with a given norm.  A 
contractual term that requires you to act in accord with such a norm requires you to do 
what you think you ought not.  Such a term is not acceptable in the sense intended here:  
acceptable terms are terms governed by norms justified in light of our values.   
 
C.  Why Are The Provisions In The Contract Consistent With Relevant Norms? 
 
Carol assumes that the terms in the Sears’ contract are consistent with relevant 
norms.  She is typical; at least where they are dealing with an established reputable seller, 
consumers expect more or less norm-consistent terms.30  But why is the assumption of 
norm-consistent terms true?  Many commentators find it obvious that sellers will exploit 
 
30
 As Hillman and Rachlinski note, 
Businesses’ concern with their reputations provides a  . . . barrier to the exploitation of 
consumers.  Businesses must worry that if they consistently include terms that exploit 
that consumer and enforce such terms, the will develop an unsavory reputation . . . 
Consumers can thus protect themselves . . . by selecting only those [businesses] with a 
good reputations. 
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra n. 1, at 442 - 43.  See also Daniel T. Ostas, Postmodern Economic 
Analysis of Law: Extending the Pragmatic Visions of Richard A. Posner, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 193, 
229 (1998) (arguing that consumers do not read boilerplate because they trust terms are 
customary to industry and reasonable "in light of community notions of fairness"); Todd D. 
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion, An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1230 (“An 
analysis recognizing the existence of contracts of adhesion in price-competitive markets admits 
that the costs saved by shifting risk to the customers via form terms may well be returned to the 
customer by means of lower prices or more advantageous terms concerning the few items that are 
generally bargained or shopped for”).   
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the fact that most buyers do not read standard form contracts to impose excessively 
seller-favorable terms.31  Why think otherwise?  Because offering norm-consistent terms 
is the best strategy for maximizing profits; hence, rational profit-motive driven sellers do 
so.32  The argument merits its own section.   
 
II.  Norm-Consistent Terms As Profit-Maximizing 
I begin with a summary of the argument:  (1) whenever a contract contains a 
norm-inconsistent term, at least some buyers will notice the inconsistency.  (2) Buyers 
who detect a norm-violation will not, other things being equal, buy from sellers offering 
norm-inconsistent terms; (3) sellers are unable to discriminate between buyers who will, 
and those who will not detect a norm-inconsistency; therefore, (4) where the market is 
 
31
 See Jason Scott Johnson, The Return of the Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-
Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 857, 861 (2006) (“By the 1970’s, both courts and commentators had reached a virtual 
consensus [that] . . . consumer product manufacturers had unbridled discretion to draft standard-
form terms such as warranties simply to minimize their costs”).  For relatively recent examples of 
the claim that sellers will exploit consumers, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition 
and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 242- 43 (1995); Michael I. Meyerson, The 
Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 1263, 1269-73, 1275 (1993); David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The 
Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 44 (1984).     
 
32
 The argument is adapted from the influential article by  Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, 
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information:  A Legal and Economic Analysis, 
127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979) [hereinafter, Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening].  Jason Johnson 
emphasizes Schwartz and Wilde’s role in countering the 1970’s hostility toward standard form 
contracting.  Johnson, supra n. 30, at 862 – 63.  Johnson offers the following summary of the 
Schwartz and Wilde argument: 
Schwartz and Wilde demonstrated in a general theoretical setting how even a quite small 
proportion of smart consumers who actually read and shopped for standard-form contract 
clauses could put enough competitive pressure on firms so that they would adopt efficient 
standard-form terms (terms whose cost to the firm was less than the value that consumers 
placed on them. 
Id.  There are two key differences between the Schwartz and Wilde argument and the one I offer.  
First, I assume contracting is a norm-governed activity while Swartz and Wilde make no mention 
of norms.  Second, my argument proposes a normative ideal while Schwartz and Wilde claim to 
model actual practice.   
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sufficiently competitive with respect to terms, the profit-maximizing strategy is to offer 
all buyers norm-consistent terms.    
 
A. The Inconsistency-Detection Assumption 
Most buyers do not read standard form contracts, so, why think that, whenever a 
contract contains a norm-inconsistent term, at least some buyers will notice the 
inconsistency?  I will not argue for this claim; I will simply assume it is true.  This—the 
inconsistency-detection assumption—is the second of the three idealizations which 
characterize the ideal formation process, and the justification for the assumption is that its 
role is limited to the characterization of that ideal.  However, as with the norm 
completeness assumption, it is worth noting that practice does reasonably closely 
approximate the detection assumption.  
To this end, consider that the inconsistency-detection assumption is extremely 
weak; it assumes only that some buyers detect norm-violations; it makes no claim about 
how many.  It is the third assumption—the assumption of a sufficiently term-competitive 
market—that includes such a claim.33  It is certainly plausible that a norm-inconsistent 
term will not escape the notice of every buyer.  To begin with, some buyers do read 
 
33
  Compare the “informed minority” assumption that plays a key role in the Schwartz and Wilde 
argument.  They assume: (1) an informed minority of buyers detect terms in standard form 
contracts that conflict with their preferences; (2) such buyers will not buy from sellers offering 
such contracts; and (3) the number of non-buying informed buyers is sufficiently great that the 
lost profit is greater than any gain the seller realizes from the offending terms.  Schwartz & 
Wilde, Intervening, supra n. 32, at 635 – 639.  See also Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect 
Information, supra n. 28, at 1417 - 1418.  Part (3) of the “informed minority” assumption has 
proven controversial.  See R. Ted Cruz & Jeffery J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper:  The 
Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS LAW 
JOURNAL 635 (1996) [hereinafter, Cruz & Hinck] (arguing that (3) is false).  I assume a version 
of (3) later, but not as an empirical claim; I assume it as part of the characterization of the ideal 
formation process.  See infra n. 41 and accompanying text.   
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contracts.34  Professional buyers purchasing for businesses and organizations read when 
their purchasing decision depends not just on price and quality but also on the contractual 
terms.35  This is especially likely to be true where the buyer is dealing with a seller of 
unknown or uncertain reputation.  Non-professional purchasers may read for the same 
reason; or, because they think that it is a mistake to enter a contract without reading it; or, 
because they value knowing all relevant aspects of a commercial transaction; or for some 
other reason.  It is, however, not necessary to read a contract to be aware of norm-
inconsistent terms.  Sellers can ensure that non-readers possess the information about 
contractual terms which they would have acquired had they read the contract.  If Hertz, 
for example, offers rental cars on contractual terms which violate relevant norms while 
Avis does not, Avis’ advertising may very well call this to the attention of potential Hertz 
customers.36  Awareness of norm-inconsistent terms can also come from publications like 
Consumer Reports, consumer watch-dog groups, and negative publicity from consumer 
complaints and litigation.37   
 
B.  Norm-Violation Detectors versus Norm-Inconsistent Sellers 
 
34
  See Hillman, Survey supra n. 16 (noting that some online buyers do read contracts).   
 
35
 Frank Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 HOUSTON L. REV. 953, 970 (2005).   
 
36
 Id. at 968. 
 
37
 See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-
Standard Terms Backfire, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 853 (2006) (hereinafter, Hillman, Boilerplate] 
(discussing the role of watchdog groups).   
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When buyers detect a norm-inconsistent provision in a seller’s contract, they will 
not—other things being equal--buy from that seller.38  To see why, recall that a norm 
specifies a regularity to which group members believe they ought to conform.  Norm-
violation detectors will, therefore, perceive a norm-inconsistent seller as not treating them 
as they ought to be treated.  Other things being equal, buyers will purchase from sellers 
they perceive as treating them as they ought to be treated, not from those whom they 
perceive as not doing so—assuming norm-consistent sellers exist.39  The third 
assumption, introduced shortly, ensures that such sellers exist.   
 
C. Sellers’ Inability to Discriminate 
How will sellers respond to the existence of norm-violation detectors who will, 
other things being equal, not buy from sellers offering norm-inconsistent contractual 
terms?  If sellers could reliably discriminate between buyers who will, and those who will 
not, detect a norm-inconsistency, it would be possible for sellers to offer norm-consistent 
terms to the inconsistency-detectors and more seller-favorable, norm-inconsistent terms 
to the rest.  In mass market contexts, however, sellers cannot reliably discriminate. 40  
 
38
 This will seem implausible if one thinks of trivial norms.  Why, for example, would buyers be 
deterred from buying if the contract was printed in Verdana even though the norm was to use 
Times New Roman?  The claim concerns norms which resolve substantive questions about how 
contracting parties ought to behave.   
 
39
 See J. R. Avrill, Studies on Anger and Aggression, 38 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 1145 (1983) 
(noting that violation of norms in an exchange provokes anger and may lead to the termination of 
the exchange).  The argument in the text provides a theoretical rational for Avrill’s results.     
 
40
  See Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening, supra n. 32, at 663 – 67 (arguing that sellers cannot 
discriminate between relevant types of buyers in mass market transactions); Cruz & Hinck, supra 
n. 33, at 672 – 675, argue that sellers may be able to discriminate between different types of 
buyers; however, only one of their arguments (Id. at 673) explicitly addresses the ability of sellers 
to differentiate between buyers based on their attitudes toward contractual terms, and that 
argument does not address the ability of sellers to tell whether or not a buyer will detect a norm-
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When you walk into a retail store or order an item over the phone or online, nothing 
reliably signals the seller whether or not you will detect norm-inconsistent terms—unless 
you try to negotiate.  If you detect a norm-inconsistent term and object to it on that basis, 
you reveal yourself as a norm-violation detector.  I am, however, focusing on those cases 
where negotiation is either not allowed, or not desired by the buyer—as is typical in the 
case of purchasing water heaters, hair dryers, personal computers, and the like.   
 
D.  The Profit-Maximizing Strategy 
The final claim is that, when sellers cannot discriminate between those who do, 
and those who do not, detect norm-inconsistencies, then, in a sufficiently term-
competitive market, the profit-maximizing strategy is to offer all buyers norm-consistent 
terms; hence, rational, profit-motive driven sellers will do so.  The argument begins by 
stating the conditions for a sufficiently term-competitive market.  There are two 
conditions; they comprise the third assumption characterizing the ideal formation 
process--the assumption of a sufficiently term-competitive market.  First:  multiple sellers 
offer more or less equivalent products at more or less the same price; buyers can just as 
easily buy from one seller as another, and sellers do not collude to ensure that they all 
offer the same contractual terms.41  Second:  there are enough norm-violation-detecting 
                                                                                                                 
inconsistent contractual term; on the contrary, the argument assumes a sales-person explicitly 
proposes a contractual term, and hence assumes a context in which detection of norm-
inconsistency would be likely.   
 
41
 The first condition is adapted from, but weaker than, the requirement of a price competitive 
market.  A market is perfectly price competitive when there is a large number of independently 
acting (non-colluding), sufficiently informed, small producers and consumers, no one of whom 
can unilaterally significantly affect price or supply; sell homogenous goods and services in a 
market in which competitors may costlessly enter and leave.  See, e. g., JEFFERY L. HARRISON, 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 261 (2007).   
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buyers that a seller’s gain from offering a norm-inconsistent term is smaller than the loss 
which results if norm-violation-detectors are able to buy from a norm-consistent seller.42  
The first condition a seller offering a norm-inconsistent term will (other things being 
equal) lose the business of every norm-violation-detecting buyer—provided that at least 
one seller offers entirely norm-consistent terms.  This follows from the fact that, other 
things being equal, buyers who detect a norm-violation in a seller’s contract will not buy 
from that seller.  The “other things being equal” rider merely concerns trivial exceptions 
which do not matter here (e. g., the buyer purchases from a norm-inconsistent seller 
because the seller is a relative).  The second condition ensures that there will be norm-
consistent sellers.  Thus, when both conditions hold, the profit-maximizing strategy is to 
offer all buyers norm-consistent terms, and hence, rational, profit-motive driven sellers 
will do so.   
It is instructive to compare the assumption of a sufficiently term-competitive 
market with the norm completeness and inconsistency-detection assumptions.  In the 
latter cases, it is plausible that practice reasonably closely approximates the ideal.  Is the 
same true of the assumption of a sufficiently term-competitive market?  Opinion is 
divided; some take the claim for granted while others raise doubts.43  Neither side in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
42
 Compare Swartz & Wilde, Intervening, supra n. 32, at 661 - 663.  They propose that there is 
lack of sufficient term-competition (in their terminology, a “monopolistic” market with respect to 
terms) if “(1) the market is not price competitive; and (2) the term at issue appears in arcane legal 
language and fine or otherwise inconspicuous print.”  Id. at 662.  The point of (2) is to identify 
those cases in which there is a high cost to consumers of searching for and understanding relevant 
contractual terms; the idea is that in such cases “too few searchers may exist to generate a 
nonmonopolistic term structure.”  Id.   
 
43
 Cruz & Hinck supra n. 33 summarize the debate and argue against the assumption of a term-
competitive market.  Cruz and Hinck’s model does not take into account the fact that a court is 
highly likely to refuse to enforce clearly norm-inconsistent terms on grounds of unconscionability 
in a standard form contract between a merchant and a consumer.  This means the gain from a 
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debate, however, denies the normative importance of the ideal of a term-competitive 
market as a guide in determining when legal regulation may be appropriate in practice.  
Since I am only proposing term-competitiveness as a normative goal, I will put to one 
side the question of the extent to which term-competitive markets exist in practice.       
   
 E.  Conclusion 
 We have reached the conclusion that, in an ideal formation process, rational, 
profit-motive driven sellers will offer all buyers norm-consistent terms.  Two further 
conclusions follow:  the terms are acceptable; and, they enhance freedom.  The norm 
completeness assumption ensures acceptability.  The norm-completeness is the 
assumption that for any possible contractual provision, there is at least one relevant, 
value-justified norm with which the provision is consistent or inconsistent.  In the ideal 
formation process, all terms will be norm-consistent.  A term consistent with all relevant 
value-justified norms is acceptable—in the sense that buyers regard (or would on 
reflection regard) the terms as ones they ought to accept and to which they ought to 
conform.  The next section argues that, given an ideal formation process, the use of 
standard form contracts promotes freedom.   
 
III. Freedom 
In a no-negotiation, standard form contract, buyers are constrained to accept the 
terms, and constrained choices are the example par excellence of unfree choices.  For 
                                                                                                                 
norm-inconsistent term would be short-lived and hence less likely than Cruz and Hinck suggest to 
outweigh associated losses.  For a recent assertion that “[c]ompetition for market share in the e-
environment may . . . deter businesses from drafting onerous terms or even motivate them to 
write terms favorable to consumers,” see Hillman, Boilerplate, supra n. 37, at 853.  
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example, when the thief, with a gun to your head, demands, “Your money or your life!”, 
the thief violates your freedom by compelling your choice.  You have only one 
meaningful option:  hand over your money.  Standard form contracting hardly rises to the 
level of gun-to-the-head compulsion; nonetheless, where refusing to enter the contract is 
not a meaningful option, no-negotiation contracting does share with the gun-to-the-head 
example the feature that your options are reduced to one.  So, how can buyers freely 
assent to the terms of a standard form contract?  There are seemingly compelling 
considerations that the answer is that they cannot.   
 
A. The Argument That Consent Is Not Free  
Margaret Radin argues forcefully that our consent to standard form contracts is 
not free.  She contends that free “[c]onsent requires a knowing understanding of what one 
is doing in a context in which it is actually possible for one to do otherwise, and an 
affirmative action in doing something, rather than a merely passive acquiescence in 
accepting something.” 44  Standard form contracting fails to meet these requirements 
when refusing to buy the product is not a meaningful option.  In such cases, it is not 
“actually possible for one to do otherwise” than enter the contract; hence, entering it is 
“merely passive acquiescence in accepting something” and not “an affirmative action in 
doing something.”   
If this is correct, enforcing standard form contracts flies in the face of the 
following fundamental principle of democratic political organization:  absent special 
circumstances, a private party does not have the power to unilaterally impose legally 
 
44
 Radin, supra n. 7, at 1126. 
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enforceable obligations on other adult parties.45  Exceptions aside, only governments can 
legitimately exercise such power.  Normally, the only way a private party can impose 
legally enforceable terms on another adult party is to secure the latter party’s free assent 
to being bound by the terms.  As Mark Lemley notes, “Assent by both parties to the terms 
of a contract has long been the fundamental principle animating contract law.  Indeed, it 
is the concept of assent that gives contracts legitimacy and distinguishes them from 
private legislation.”46   
 
B.  The Solution 
 The problem is an illusion.  In an ideal formation process, buyers do freely assent 
to the terms of standard form contracts; hence, consent is free in practice to the extent 
practice approximates the ideal.  Ironically, it is precisely the no-negotiation aspect of 
standard form contracting that promotes buyers’ freedom.   
The key point is that even a highly constrained choice can, depending on the 
circumstances, be an entirely free choice.  Imagine, for example, that you have your heart 
set on a vacation in the Cayman Islands; unfortunately, your tight budget cannot afford 
the prohibitively expensive food in the Caymans.  Your solution is to constrain your food 
choices by opting for an “all inclusive” vacation package which offers airfare, hotel, and 
food for a single relatively low price.  In doing so, you voluntarily constrain your food 
options in order to freely realize your vacation goal.  Contrast the thief example.  You do 
have an option:  You could refuse and be shot.  The gun-compulsion violates your 
 
45
 See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra n. 1, at 464 - 65.   
 
46
 Id.   
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freedom of choice, not because it leaves you without any option, but because it leaves 
you without a meaningful one.  In the Cayman islands vacation example, eating the hotel-
provided-food is a meaningful option in the sense that it is an essential means to realizing 
your vacation goal.  Similarly, the no-negotiation aspect of standard form contracts does 
not violate freedom because the use of the contracts does not deprive buyers of a 
meaningful choice.     
Carol’s water heater purchase illustrates the point.  The demise of the water heater 
was an unwelcome intrusion that disrupted her pursuit of important goals; she wants to 
return pursuing those goals as quickly as possible by spending the minimum time and 
effort necessary to obtain a water heater on acceptable contractual terms. 47  The standard 
form contract offers her a pre-packaged deal which--assuming an ideal formation 
process--she knows is acceptable without even having to read the contract.  Entering the 
contract is a highly cost-effective means for her to freely pursue her goals.  In this way, 
entering the contract enhances her freedom.  Indeed, Carol meets two of Radin’s three 
requirements for free consent.  
Radin insists that free “[c]onsent requires [1] a knowing understanding of what 
one is doing [2] in a context in which it is actually possible for one to do otherwise, and 
[3] an affirmative action in doing something, rather than a merely passive acquiescence in 
accepting something.”48  Carol meets the first and third requirements. She has “a 
knowing understanding of what [she] is doing” since she knows the contractual terms are 
acceptable.  In addition, entering the contract is a cost-effective means to further the 
 
47
 W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and the Democratic Control of Lawmaking 
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 532(1971) (emphasizing the scarcity of time in modern life).  
 
48
 Radin, supra n. 7, at 1126. 
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pursuit of important goals, so entering it is not “passive acquiescence” but an “affirmative 
action” that fits into an overall plan aimed at effectively realizing ends.  The only 
requirement Carol fails to meet is that it should be “actually possible for one to do 
otherwise.”  It is not possible for Carol to do otherwise—in the sense that she has to have 
a water heater, and any contract under which she purchases one will almost certainly be a 
no-negotiation contract containing similar terms.  But it is precisely the possibility of 
negotiation that Carol does not want.  She wants the pre-packaged deal as an convenient, 
cost-effective way to pursue ends that are important to her.  It is the need not to negotiate 
that enhances Carol’s freedom.49  But doesn’t the no-negotiation contract nonetheless 
deprive Carol of the freedom to negotiate if she wanted to?  And, to that extent, doesn’t it 
violate freedom?  The answer is that Carol does not want to negotiate.  Why would she?  
She knows the terms are acceptable in the sense that she regards them as the terms to 
which she ought to agree.  Negotiation would be pointless.   
 
C.  Conclusion 
In an ideal formation process, the use of standard form contracts results in 
acceptable terms and promotes freedom.  As noted earlier, we, should for this reason, 
adopt the ideal formation process as a normative goal; we should, that is, try to ensure 
that practice sufficiently closely approximates that ideal.  I now turn the question of the 
extent to which the use of EULAs approximates the ideal formation process.  To what 
 
49
 This conclusion is consistent with Karl Llewellyn’s claim that the law should create an 
assumption of consent to standard terms and enforce them as long as they are not unfairly 
presented or unfair in their substance.  See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:  
DECIDING APPEALS 370 – 371 (1960).  The courts generally take Llewellyn’s approach.  See 
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra n. 1, at 455. 
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extent, that is, does practice approximate the assumptions of norm completeness, 
inconsistency-detection, and a sufficiently term-competitive market?   
  
IV. The Lack of Value-Justified Norms in EULAs 
I focus entirely on norm completeness.  I do not mean to suggest that it is 
unproblematic to assume that the relevant markets are sufficiently term-competitive, or 
even that it is unproblematic to assume that the inconsistency-detection assumption is 
approximately true.  There are two reasons for focusing on norm-completeness.  The first 
is that the assumption fails to hold for EULAs; the second is that it illuminates the 
academic criticisms of EULAs to set those criticisms in the context of an analysis of the 
failure of the norm-completeness assumption.   
Norm completeness fails because, in the case of certain key contractual 
provisions, relevant norms do exist, but they are not value-justified.  The consequences of 
this failure are that the relevant terms are unacceptable and reduce freedom.     
Acceptability:  If you are contractually bound to act in accord with a term 
governed by a norm that is not value-justified, you are required to act as you think you 
ought not to act given your values.  The term is consequently unacceptable; acceptable 
terms are terms governed by norms which are justified in light of our values.50   
Freedom:  Being bound to act in accord with an unacceptable term reduces your 
freedom since the seller requires you to do what you think you ought not to do.  Your 
freedom is reduced because someone else requires you to act contrary to what you would 
 
50
 See supra Section III(A)(1). 
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have chosen to do without their interference.51  Market forces are unlikely to remedy this 
situation and hence legal action is required to ensure that the offending terms are replaced 
or modified in appropriate ways.   
Before arguing that EULAs contain terms not governed by value-justified norms, 
one preliminary is in order.  It is helpful to distinguish between two types of contractual 
terms:  risk allocation terms, and normal course terms.  The lack of value-justified norms 
occurs only with the latter.   
 
A. Two Types of Terms 
Risk allocation terms assign the risks associated with product malfunctions; they 
include warranties, limitations on liability, and arbitration clauses.  Normal course terms 
do not assign malfunction risks; rather, they specify obligations arising in the normal 
course of the product’s performance (e. g., an obligation to have the products serviced 
only by authorized service personnel).52  Any contractual provision imposing an 
obligation is either a risk allocation term or a normal course term.  There are, after all, 
only two possibilities:  either the contract is performed as promised, or it is not.  Terms 
relevant in the first eventuality are normal course terms; terms relevant in the second are 
risk allocation terms.   
 
51
 See, e. g., RICHARD WARNER, FREEDOM, ENJOYMENT, AND HAPPINESS, Chapter III (1987) 
(explaining and defending freedom as self-direction in light of one’s values).   
 
52
 The purchaser of a new car, for example, is typically obligated to have the car serviced by 
authorized mechanics on pain of invalidating warranties provide by the seller.  The obligation to 
make periodic payments is another example of a normal course obligation.   
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Normal course terms are relatively rare in standard form contracts governing the 
sale of non-digital consumer goods.53  When you buy a hair dryer, for example, the seller 
typically does not impose significant contractual restrictions on your use of the hair dryer.  
You simply become the owner of that piece of personal property and may, within broad 
limits, do with it as you wish.  In EULAs, on the other hand, sellers typically retain 
ownership to the software and merely license certain uses of it.54  Normal course terms 
define the limits of the license.  The norms governing certain crucial limit-defining terms 
turn out not to be value-justified.   
 
B. Risk Allocation Terms  
Completeness and clarity call for a brief consideration of risk allocation terms.  
Courts have refused to enforce at least three types of risk allocation terms in EULAs:  
restrictions on class actions,55 unreasonable arbitration clauses,56 and unreasonable choice 
of law and choice of forum provisions.57  The effect in each case was to severely 
circumscribe the ability of buyers to obtain effective redress against a breaching buyer.  
The litigation does not, however, suggest a lack of value-justified norms, just the 
opposite.  There is a value-justified norm violated by including such terms in a standard 
 
53
 See supra  n. 52 for examples of normal course terms that do appear in contracts for the sale of 
non-digital products.   
 
54
 See infra n. 70.  . 
 
55
 See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4th 148, 162-163 (2005), and Gatton v. T-Mobile 
USA, Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 571 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2007). 
 
56
 See Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (N. D. Cal. 2002). 
 
57
 See Aral v. Earthlink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 231 (Cal. App. 2d 2005). 
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form contract:  terms in a standard form contract should not deprive buyers of the 
practical possibility of a judicial remedy.  The cases reveal courts refusing to enforce 
contractual terms when overreaching sellers violate this norm.   
In general, risk allocation terms in EULAs have generated relatively little 
controversy.  One plausible explanation is that software, after all, is still a product, and 
that the risk allocation issues which arise in regard to software are not all that different 
from the risk allocation issues arising in regard to non-digital products.  It is, therefore, 
reasonable to assume that the norms relevant in non-digital standard form contracts have 
proven readily adaptable to the software context.  It would be interesting to pursue this 
line of inquiry, but I will not do so here; instead, I turn to normal course terms.   
 
 C.  Normal Course Terms 
EULAs contain significant normal course terms which fail to be governed by 
value-justified norms.  In support of this claim, I consider two normal course terms, terms 
which have been at the center of the debate about EULAs:  prohibitions on reverse 
engineering; and, prohibitions on the allowing transfers of the software to third parties.  
Both terms restrict the intellectual property rights buyers would otherwise typically 
acquire when purchasing the software. In each case, the terms are consistent with the 
relevant, prevailing norm; however—as the criticisms in the literature clearly establish--
the norms are not value-justified.  After discussing reverse engineering and transfers to 
third parties, I consider whether there are other terms in EULAs which are not governed 
by value-justified norms.   
 
  33 
  1.  Reverse engineering 
Reverse engineering software consists in examining its programming in order to 
learn how the software works.58  Under federal copyright law, reverse engineering is 
permissible as a fair use provided it is done for a legitimate purpose (such as to gain 
access to functional specifications necessary to make a compatible program), and when 
reverse engineering provides the only means of access to those elements of the software 
that are not protected by intellectual property rights.59  Software licenses, however, 
typically prohibit reverse engineering.60  The main motive for doing so is to control the 
ability to write programs (called “applications” in this context) which interoperate with 
the seller’s program (called a “platform”).61  Many software manufacturers believe they 
gain a competitive advantage by controlling interoperability.62 Contractual prohibitions 
on reverse engineering help provide such control.  The reason lies in the fact that, to write 
an interoperable application, the application developer usually needs to know facts about 
 
58
 ELDAD EILAM, REVERSING: SECRETS OF REVERSE ENGINEERING viii (2005). 
 
59 Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. 977 F 2d 1510, 1523 – 24 (9th Cir. 1993).   
 
60
 See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 YALE L. J. 1575, 1661 (2002) [hereinafter, Samuelson & Scotchmer, Reverse 
Engineering].   
 
61
 Sellers are not primarily concerned to prevent the development of competing products.  
Reverse engineering software is difficult and expensive to be an efficient way to develop a 
competing product.  Samuelson & Scotchmer, Reverse Engineering, supra n. 60, at 1613 – 1615.     
 
62
 As Samuelson and Scotchmer note, “no one would dispute that Microsoft’s control over the 
APIs for developing applications for the Windows platform is an important source of its enduring 
power in this market.”  Samuelson & Scotchmer, Reverse Engineering, supra n. 60, at 1620. To 
write a program that will run on Microsoft Windows, you need to know the application program 
interfaces (APIs).  Microsoft maintains the APIs as a trade secret and licenses access to them.  
Programmers unwilling to enter into the necessary license agreement have one other way of 
gaining access to the APIs:  reverse engineer Windows.  Microsoft contractually blocks this path 
to access by prohibiting reverse engineering in the Windows license.     
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the platform maintained as trade secrets.  The developer typically has two ways to obtain 
the requisite knowledge:  reverse engineer the software, or enter into a license agreement 
with the platform sellers.  Contractually prohibiting reverse engineering increases a 
platform seller’s control over the creation of interoperable products by compelling (law 
abiding) application developers to negotiate with them to obtain the knowledge they 
need.   
The current norm is that platform sellers may contractually prohibit reverse 
engineering.  A norm is a sanction-supported regularity which exists in part because 
people think they ought to act in accord with the regularity.  There is a relevant sanction-
supported regularity:  application developers (for the most part) abide by sellers’ 
contractually imposed restrictions on reverse engineering, restrictions the courts enforce.  
For this regularity to qualify as a norm, application developers must abide by the 
restrictions because they think they ought to.  It may appear that people do not think they 
ought to conform.  Commentators argue that sellers should not be allowed to impose 
prohibitions on reverse engineering,63 and there are situations in which buyers would 
prefer to reverse engineer instead of negotiate a license agreement.64  So why believe 
buyers think they ought to abide by contractual prohibitions on reverse engineering?  
Because the restrictions are (currently) legally enforceable, and the buyers think that they 
ought to abide by the law.65   
 
63
 See infra text accompanying notes 66 – 68. 
 
64
 See Samuelson & Scotchmer, Reverse Engineering, supra n. 60,  1615 - 20.   
 
65
 See Section I(A)(1).   
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The crucial question is whether the norm is value-justified.  A norm is value-
justified if we would, after sufficient, adequately informed, and unbiased reflection, 
regard conformity to the norm as justified in light of the values we hold.  It is extremely 
unlikely that we would so conclude.  Those who have carefully considered the question 
conclude—tentatively or unequivocally—that sellers should not have unlimited discretion 
to prohibit reverse engineering.  The fundamental reason is that allowing reverse 
engineering is an important factor in promoting innovation and competition, and in 
ensuring compatibility between products.  As Samuelson and Scotchmer note in their 
definitive analysis of reverse engineering,  
. . . the welfare effects of reverse engineering in the software industry are . . . 
complex . . . However, on balance, reverse engineering and interoperability are 
important because they promote development of a wider range of software from a 
wider array of developers than a market in which platform developers were 
insulated from reverse engineering.  To the extent that the enforcement of anti-
reverse engineering clauses would have a detrimental effect on competitive 
development and innovation, legal decisionmakers may be justified in not 
enforcing them.66 
 
Julie Cohen and Mark Lemley reach a less tentative conclusion than Samuelson and 
Scotchmer’s “legal decisionmakers may be justified in not enforcing” prohibitions on 
reverse engineering.  Cohen and Lemley note that “[t]he wisdom of permitting reverse 
engineering of software has been extensively debated in the last two decades,”67 and they 
conclude that “advocates of reverse engineering have the better part of the argument.”68   
 
66
 Samuelson & Scotchmer, Reverse Engineering, supra n. 60, at 1629 - 30.    
 
67
 Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 
CALIFORNIA L. REV. 1, 21 (2001).   
 
68
 Id.   
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 I conclude that the current norm, “Allow sellers to prohibit reverse engineering” 
is not value-justified.  It follows that including prohibitions on reverse engineering in 
standard form contracts used to mass market software imposes on buyers unacceptable 
terms which violate freedom.  Enforcing such terms is, therefore, inconsistent with 
realizing the normative goal of approximating the ideal formation process; hence, courts 
should not enforce them, and, if courts continue to do so, legislative action should ensure 
that such terms are not enforceable.  But is legal intervention clearly necessary?  Why 
won’t the market remedy the situation?  It could do so by leading to the emergence of a 
value-justified norm governing restrictions on reverse engineering; once such a norm 
emerged, sellers would offer terms consistent with the norm (assuming a sufficiently 
close approximation to the ideal formation process).  This has not yet happened, and the 
persistence in EULAs of prohibitions on reverse engineering provides reason to think that 
the future will resemble the past.   
It bears emphasis that this conclusion holds only for the standard form contracts 
used to mass market software.  It does not follow for contracts where parties of roughly 
equal bargaining power explicitly negotiate terms.  In the standard form case, buyers (in 
an ideal formation process) rely on the existence of value-justified norms to ensure that 
the terms are acceptable.  There is no such reliance in the case of explicitly negotiated 
terms.  Of course, one may argue that prohibitions on reverse engineering should not be 
enforceable in such cases as well; my point is only that this conclusion does not follow 
from the arguments given here.   
What are the prospects for repairing this defect in EULAs?  The problem is that 
norm completeness fails because the current norm governing contractual restrictions on 
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reverse engineering is not value-justified.  The solution is to ensure that a relevant value-
justified norm exists in regard to such restrictions.  It does not seem difficult to propose 
such a norm; indeed, Julie Cohen and Mark Lemley argue persuasively that the norm 
should be that sellers may not prohibit reverse engineering when it is done for a 
legitimate purpose (such as to gain access to functional specifications necessary to make 
a compatible program), and when reverse engineering provides the only means of access 
to those elements of the software that are not protected by intellectual property rights. 69   
 
2. Prohibitions on transfers to third-parties 
In the typical EULA, the seller retains title to the software, licensing certain uses, 
but prohibiting or limiting the transfer of the software to third parties.70  If sellers did not 
retain title, buyers could resell the software under the Copyright Act’s “first sale” 
doctrine, which provides “the owner of a particular copy . . . is entitled . . . to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy.”71  Digital copies do not degrade in the 
way non-digital copies do, and sellers fear that the widespread availability of “good as 
new” used software will have a serious impact on the market for new software. 72   The 
 
69
 Id. at 6 (2000) (proposing “a limited right to reverse engineer patented computer programs to 
permit the study of those programs and the duplication of their unprotected elements”).   
 
70
 See R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 BOSTON 
COLLEGE L. REV 577, 614 (2003) (noting that EULAs “often” license only certain uses and do 
not transfer title).  See, also, Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the 
Night: Reforming Copyright Owner Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 20 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 
495, 498 – 99 (2004) (“Many contracts used by copyright owners today seek to . . . limit the 
application of the first sale doctrine 
 
71
 17 U.S.C. §109(a)).   
 
72
 Pamela Samuelson, Digital Media and The Changing Face of Intellectual Property Law, 16 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 323, 325 - 8 (1990).   
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used software would be considerably less expensive (or available for free from libraries), 
yet might nonetheless meet the needs of many buyers.   
The current norm is—roughly--that sellers may contractually prohibit transfers to 
third parties.  This is a sanction-supported regularity:  EULAs do routinely prohibit 
transfers, and courts enforce the prohibitions.73  But do people think that they ought to 
abide by the regularity?  They must if the regularity is to qualify as a norm, and it may 
seem they do not.  After all, people routinely allow friends and acquaintances to copy 
their software;74 licensed users of Macromedia’s Dreamweaver, for example, may lend 
the installation CD to friends for them to install the program (although doing so is 
prohibited by the license).  This does not, however, show that people routinely transfer 
their own copies to others; it does not show that licensed users of software routinely sell 
or give away their own copies of the program.  To some extent, they very well may; 
however, two facts are clear:  there is no well-established secondary market in used 
software; and, libraries do not routinely loan a wide range of commercially available 
software (you cannot borrow a copy of Windows, for example).  It is certainly plausible 
that at least part of the explanation is that people think they ought not to make the 
software available in these ways.  The “ought” here may be purely prudential.  They may 
think that the activity is illegal and that they are very likely to get sued by the 
manufacturer, and on that basis they think they ought not to sell.  For the sake of 
argument, let us agree that the current norm is that sellers may, at least, contractually 
 
73
 Id.     
 
74
 Id. (pointing out that users routinely ignore the restriction).   
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prohibit the systematic, public transfer of software via a secondary market or via 
libraries.   
Even if this is the norm, it is not value-justified.  The argument is essentially the 
same as in the case of reverse engineering:  Those who have carefully considered the 
question conclude that sellers should not have the largely unlimited ability to prohibit or 
restrict lending or reselling of software.  The argument emphasizes the value we place on 
communication and the dissemination of knowledge and contends there is an 
unacceptable conflict with this value when sellers prohibit the commercial transfer of 
software in a secondary, used-software market, and the non-commercial transfer of 
software by public and private archives and libraries.75  A library which has, for example, 
acquired the web site creation program, Dreamweaver, under a EULA which prohibits 
allowing a third party to copy the software, cannot legally allow me to install—even 
temporarily—the program on my computer so that I can create a web site.76  The EULA 
restriction prevents me from communicating and disseminating knowledge over the web.  
 
75
 See Reese, supra n. 70, at 646 - 648 (2003) (noting the negative impact on libraries and on the 
availability of software generally), and Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons 
in the Night:  Reforming Copyright Owner Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 20 OHIO N. U. L. 
REV. 495, 496 (2004) (arguing sellers restrict transfers to third parties to “obtain advantages that 
may not be socially beneficial).   
 
76
 The Internet has greatly expanded possibilities for libraries and archives. See Rebecca Tushnet, 
My Library:  Copyright and the role of Institutions in a Peer-To-Peer World, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
977 (2006) (discussing the development and importance of public and private archives on the 
Internet).  Rebecca Bolin nicely summarizes the value libraries as a mechanism for the non-
commercial transfer of works: 
In the Nineteenth Century, American libraries were founded to be public places of 
education and betterment, as democratic institutions.  The library was a place of 
education that allowed the democratic governing populace to be sufficiently informed.  
As an economic matter, the library was the answer to the tension between market-based 
information production and intellectual property as a necessary public good.  Libraries 
are an exception to allow a limited monopoly on copyrighted works. 
Rebecca Bolin, Locking Down the Library:  How Copyright, Contract, and Cybertrespass Block 
Internet Archiving, 29 HASTINGS COMM. &  ENT. L. J. 1, 10 (2006) 
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It does, that is, to the extent that I am unable to acquire a web site creation program by 
other means.  If there were a secondary market in—relatively cheap—used software, I 
might be able to buy a copy.  However, the restriction on transfers to third-parties 
prevents the formation of such a market and thereby prevents the acquisition of software 
by those of limited financial means.   
We should not, therefore, regard the “sellers may restrict transfers to third-
parties” norm as value-justified, and, as with prohibitions on reverse engineering, it 
follows that, standard form contracts used to mass market software, such terms should 
not be enforced.  The argument is the same as before: enforcing such terms is inconsistent 
with realizing the normative goal of approximating the ideal formation process, and the 
persistence in EULAs of restrictions on transfers to third-parties is evidence that market 
forces are inadequate to eliminate such terms.  As in the case of prohibitions on reverse 
engineering, this conclusion follows only for the standard form contracts used to mass 
market software and not for contracts where parties of roughly equal bargaining power 
explicitly negotiate terms.  The difference is that, in standard form contracting, buyers 
rely on the existence of value-justified norms to ensure that the terms are acceptable 
while there is no such reliance in the case of explicitly negotiated terms.   
What are the prospects of remedying this failure of the norm completeness 
assumption by ensuring that an appropriate, value-justified norm governs restrictions on 
transfers to third-parties?  Should sellers have some ability to restrict transfers to third-
parties?  The answer is unclear.  As Anthony Reese notes, “[t]he first sale doctrine has 
been a major bulwark in providing public access by facilitating the existence of used 
book and record stores, video rental stores, and, perhaps most significantly, public 
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libraries.”77  However, as Reese emphasizes, “[t]echnology has begun to change 
dramatically the environment in which the first sale doctrine operates,”78 and he argues 
persuasively that, given the technological and economic complexity of the situation, it is 
too soon to tell what sort of restrictions on the first sale doctrine, if any, are appropriate.79  
There is, however, no evident reason to think that will not eventually be able to identify 
an appropriate norm governing restrictions on transfers to third-parties.   
 
C.  Same Problem, Other Terms? 
Are there other terms in EULAs which are not governed by value-justified norms?  
A complete treatment of EULAs would catalogue their typical terms and determine 
whether they were governed by relevant, value-justified norms.  Here, I will confine 
myself to suggesting two more terms which may raise concerns about lack of value-
justification.  First:  EULAs typically impose restrictions on publishing the results of 
benchmark tests.  Benchmark tests of software may report misleadingly poor 
performance if the tested software is improperly installed, or if it is not the most recently 
updated version.  Sellers typically protect their interest in accuracy by imposing 
conditions in the EULA on the publication of benchmark tests. 80   Such restrictions 
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 Reese, supra n. 70, at 577.   
 
78
 Id. at 578.  
 
79
 Id. at 616 – 652.   
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 Prior to 2001, for example, Network Associates sold its popular McAfee anti-virus program, 
VirusScan, subject to a clickwrap agreement which contained the following provision:  “The 
customer shall not disclose the result of any benchmark test to any third party without Network 
Associates' prior written approval.”  See People v. Network Associates, Inc. 758 N.Y.S.2d 466, 
457 (2003). 
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conflict with the value we place on free speech, and hence raise questions about whether 
a norm permitting such restrictions is value-justified. 81  Second:  EULAs often grant 
sellers the right to electronically access the hard drive in order to verify that the use of the 
software complies with the requirements of the license. 82  Would a norm permitting such 
access be value-justified?  Brick-and-mortar analogies suggest otherwise; Gucci does not 
have the right to enter my home or stop me on the street to determine whether the items I 
have bearing the Gucci label are really Gucci.   
 
D.  Conclusion 
Currently, relevant norms permit sellers to prohibit reverse engineering and 
restrict transfers to third-parties.  These norms are not value-justified; hence, terms 
prohibiting reverse engineering and restricting transfers to third-parties are unacceptable 
and violate freedom.  The terms should, therefore, not be enforced.  The remedy for this 
defect in EULAs is to identify, or create, appropriate, value-justified norms.  There is no 
evident reason why we should not be able to do so.   
EULAs are legitimately seen as a form of Internet contracting when the software 
is purchased over the Internet and delivered by downloading it; indeed, Internet purchase 
 
81
 There is a norm, familiar from but certainly not confined to free speech jurisprudence:  a 
restriction on speech is not justified if there is a less restrictive alternative that adequately serves 
the purpose of the original restriction.  “Explicit approval” provisions arguably conflict with this 
norm as there appears to be a less restrictive alternative:  allow disclosure of results without 
requiring seller approval as long as the test complies with specified conditions (posted on a web 
site, for example).  Benchmark testing restrictions now tend to be of the “comply with 
conditions” type.  Such conditions began to replace “explicit approval” conditions after the court 
struck down Network Associates' “explicit approval” condition in People v. Network Associates, 
supra n. 80, at 468.   
 
82
 For example, the license agreement for Windows Vista operating system contains such 
provisions. See Michael Geist, Vista’s Fine Print, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/1641/135.  
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and delivery is arguably an ideal way to secure a buyer’s agreement to a standard form, 
no-negotiation contract:  the installation program is already on the buyer’s hard drive 
before he or she can read the contract.  However, the challenges EULAs raise—the 
concerns about reverse engineering and transfers to third parties—would arise even if the 
Internet were not involved.  The same is not true of TOUs.  Not only are TOUs formed 
over the Internet, they also govern our use of web sites; as a result, TOUs raise 
contractual issues that would not arise in the absence of the Internet.   
   
V. TOUs 
A complete treatment of TOUs would catalogue the types of risk allocation and 
normal course terms they contain and would determine whether the terms are governed 
relevant, value-justified norms.  I will not offer such a treatment.  I focus instead on the 
fact that TOUs typically contain provisions permitting the web site to collect and use 
information about web site visitors.  I advance three claims.  The first is that the current 
norm is that a business may collect and use a wide range of information about consumers.  
The second is that this norm is not value-justified; the third, that it is unlikely that this 
lack of value-justification will be remedied any time soon.   
In the United States, a business may, with relatively few restrictions, impose 
contractual terms that allow them to collect and use wide variety of different types of 
information about consumers.83  I contend that this is not only the law, but also the 
prevailing norm, at least in the case of online businesses.  The first part of the definition 
of a norm is fulfilled for online businesses:  contractually-mediated online business 
 
83
 See, e. g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877 
(2003) (analyzing and criticizing the current state of privacy law).     
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collection and use of information is a sanction-supported regularity.  It is clearly are 
regularity.  Online businesses routinely include in their TOUs terms allowing them to 
collect and use a wide variety of information about their web site visitors.  Indeed, as a 
recent Privacy International report notes,  
We are witnessing an increased ‘race to the bottom’ in corporate surveillance of 
customers. Some companies are leading the charge through abusive and invasive 
profiling of their customers' data. This trend is seen by even the most privacy 
friendly companies as creating competitive disadvantage to those who do not 
follow that trend, and in some cases to find new and more innovative ways to 
become even more surveillance-intensive.84 
 
To remain competitive, companies increase their customer surveillance in response to 
increases by competitors; as a result TOUs contain terms allowing online businesses ever 
more expansive powers to collect and use information.  This regularity is a sanction-
supported one.  The courts routinely enforce contractual provisions allowing businesses 
to collect information.85   
It may seem, however, that the second part of the definition of a norm cannot 
possibly be fulfilled; it may seem that consumers do not think they ought to abide by the 
regularity.  After all, there has been, and continues to be, intense, widespread criticism of 
allowing business the largely unrestricted ability to collect and use information.  
Allowing them to do so increases the risk of harm to individuals;86 subjects us to 
 
84 Privacy International, A Race to the Bottom – Privacy Ranking of Internet Service Companies, 
http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd%5B347%5D=x-347-553961.   
 
85  
 
86
  See, e. g., Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, U. OF PA. L. REV. 477 (2006) [hereinafter, 
Solove].   
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information overload;87 gives excessive, easily abused power to credit agencies, 
insurance companies, and businesses generally;88 has a chilling effect on decision-
making; inhibits the development of the self;89 creates the possibility of approaching a 
perfect enforcement of rules and laws that would create a merciless “Big Brother” 
inconsistent with the true demands of justice and forgiveness;90 and puts civil society 
itself at risk.91  It would, however, be a mistake to conclude that consumers do not think 
that they ought to abide by the norm.  It is still possible, and indeed likely, that they do.  
The reason is the simple, and by now familiar one, that the contractual provisions are 
enforceable, and people generally think they ought to obey the law; consequently, they 
ought to abide by laws that allow businesses to collect and use information.  In any case, 
grant for the sake of argument that the current norm is that a business may impose 
contractual terms that allow it to collect and use a very wide range of information about 
consumers.   
 
87
 See DICK EASTMAN, FIGHTING INFORMATION OVERLOAD ON THE WEB, 
http://www.lulu.com/content/889152.   
 
88
 See JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY IN PERIL 32, 93 – 142 (2007) [hereinafter, RULE].   
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 Id. at 186 – 188.   
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 See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS:  LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 267 – 268 (2007); and, RULE, supra n. 
80, at 5 – 6. 
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 The point is made forcefully (but without use of the expression “civil society”) by Robert Post, 
Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and the Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. 
REV. 957 (1989).  See also Helen Nissenbaum, Technology, Values, and the Justice System:  
Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV.  119, 148 - 152 (2004) (emphasizing the 
connections between privacy, autonomy, and democracy); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: 
Informational Privacy and the Subject As Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (noting that 
threats to privacy constitute threats to “civil society”); and, Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and 
Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999) (same).   
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The essential point is that the norm is not value-justified.  That is what the wide-
spread, intense criticism of the norm shows.  The many who have carefully considered 
the question conclude that the largely unrestricted collection and use of information by 
businesses is not justified in light of our values.  It follows that the legal system should 
refuse to enforce such terms.  Enforcing them is inconsistent with realizing the normative 
goal of approximating the ideal formation process,92 and the persistence of such terms in 
TOUs is evidence that market forces are unlikely to remedy the situation without legal 
intervention.  As in the case of prohibitions on reverse engineering, this conclusion 
follows only for the standard form contracts used to mass market software and not for 
contracts where parties of roughly equal bargaining power explicitly negotiate terms.  
Will this situation to be remedied relatively soon by the emergence of relevant 
value-justified norms?  That is unlikely.  Any such norms would have to strike a proper 
balance between two conflicting interests.  One is our interest in informational privacy, in 
controlling what others know about us and what they do with that information; the other 
is efficiency.  The information increases businesses efficiency,93 and, efficiency matters:  
the more efficient we are the less time, effort, and money we spend to achieve our desired 
results, and the more we have left over for other purposes.  In the new technological and 
economic setting of the twenty-first century, we do not know how to make this tradeoff in 
an acceptable way.  As Daniel Solove notes,  
 
92 As with EULA restrictions on reverse engineering and transfers to third parties, this 
conclusion follows only for standard form, no negotiation agreements where web site 
visitors are relying on the existence of value-justified norms to ensure the 
acceptability of contractual terms.   
 
93
 RULE, supra n. 88, at 156 – 162; see also Richard Warner, Surveillance and the Self: Privacy, 
Identity, and Technology, 54 DE PAUL L. REV. 847, 849 – 52 (2005).     
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[p]rivacy is a concept in disarray.  Nobody can articulate what it means.  As one 
commentator has observed, privacy suffers from “an embarrassment of 
meanings.” Privacy is far too vague a concept to guide adjudication and 
lawmaking, as abstract incantations of the importance of “privacy” do not fare 
well when pitted against more concretely stated countervailing interests.94 
 
I am not suggesting that we cannot find an adequate resolution to the tradeoff between 
our interest in privacy and the gains of efficiency.  I am just suggesting it will be a long 
and difficult task, and, until that task is completed, we will lack relevant, value-justified 
norms governing contractual provisions allowing businesses to collect information about 
their customers’ activities.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 The requirement of value-justified norms is a powerful constraint on the 
enforceability of terms in standard form contracts.  It makes the focus of enforceability 
the values of consumers since it requires enforceable terms to be consistent with norms 
that consumers do, or would on adequate reflection, regard as justified in light of their 
values.  The justification for this requirement is that, by imposing it, we ensure that 
standard form contracting yields acceptable terms that enhance the freedom of buyers.  
EULAs and TOUs illustrate the point.  Both contain terms which fail to be governed by 
value-justified norms and the failure provides a reason for refusing to enforce those 
terms.  The ultimate remedy, however, is to identify, or create, an appropriate value-
justified norm.  How are appropriate value-justified norms to be identified or, where 
necessary, created?  The analysis I have provided raises but does not answer this 
question.    
 
94
 Solove, supra n. 86, at 477 – 8.   
